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The classic Lucas asset pricing model with symmetric information and com-
plete markets almost exclusively focuses on equilibrium prices and returns. As
the unique equilibrium in this model is Pareto e￿cient, it can be solved for
under the representative agent paradigm. Consequently, such a model stresses
aggregate market risk and, hence, fails to investigate the impact of any form
of heterogeneity in risk attitudes and/or endowments on the dynamics of the
equilibrium quantities and measures of trading volume.
It is commonly thought that models which focus on market risk only, are
unable to produce the large trading volume observed in most stock markets.
In addition, and as shown by Wang (1994), heterogeneity in risk attitudes of
agents has di￿erent implications for the co-movement of equilibrium prices and
portfolios than heterogeneous information among agents. For these reasons,
most models which explicitly derive the equilibrium trading volume link asset
quantity directly to the ￿ow of information and, thus, introduce di￿erential or
insider information.1 But, since asymmetric information is the only motive for
trade in these models, they have to circumvent the informational no trade theo-
rems of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Holmstr ￿ om and Myerson (1984). This
fundamental result states that given a Pareto e￿cient allocation, the arrival of
additional information cannot lead to trade, and hence does not generate any
incremental trading volume. The apparent paradox between information based
models of trading volume and the informational no trade theorems is resolved
through the introduction of so-called noise traders whose presence guarantees
that the market clearing conditions, which impose informational equilibrium
constraints, are automatically satis￿ed. Loosely speaking, in such models there
always exists a counterparty which is willing to trade contingent on information
signals received by an optimizing agent. As a consequence, additional informa-
tion always causes trade. But it is important to note that without introducing
liquidity traders the informational no-trade theorem holds and asymmetric in-
formation will not necessarily increase trading volume.
At the intuitive level, it is well understood that in homogeneous informa-
tion models the degree of heterogeneity with respect to endowments, preferences
and beliefs determines the equilibrium trading volume, but a formal study of
this subject has not been undertaken so far. A notable exception is Judd et
al. (2003) who discuss the properties of the equilibrium trading volume in a
discrete time complete market economy with ￿nite state space populated by
1Such models are either solved in a competitive setting (see e.g. Wang (1994)) or allow
for strategic interactions among agents (see P￿eiderer (1984), Kyle (1985) and Foster and
Vishwanathan (1990, 1993)).
1agents endowed with heterogeneous preferences. They show that when the ex-
ogenous dividend process is an irreducible, stationary Markov chain, optimal
consumption policies are time homogeneous, and conclude that no trading oc-
curs after the initial period. Notice, however, that the stationary nature of the
Markov chain process does not permit to introduce growth in the aggregate div-
idend, and might therefore be a strong restriction. It is not a priori evident that
their results extend to a more general setting, namely that in a dynamically
complete economy, preference heterogeneity alone is not su￿cient to generate
trading. The main objective of this paper is to investigate under what condi-
tions non-informational heterogeneity leads to non trivial equilibrium trading
volume. Our main result comes in form of a non-informational no trade the-
orem. It provides necessary and su￿cient conditions for zero trading volume
after the initial period in a dynamically e￿cient market model with multiple
goods, homogeneous information and homogeneous beliefs.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our model of
a continuous time, multi-good economy. Next, Section 3 introduces simplifying
notation, and presents preliminary results. Then in Section 4, we present our
main result and discuss a number of examples. Section 5 discusses extensions
of the basic model to include heterogeneous beliefs and random endowments.
2 The Economy
We consider a continuous time, stochastic economy on the ￿nite time interval
[0;T], which we proceed to describe in the following sections.
2.1 Information Structure
The uncertainty is represented by a probability space (￿ ;F;F;P) on which is
de￿ned an n￿dimensional Brownian motion B. The ￿ltration
F :=
n
Ft : t 2 [0;T]
o
is the augmentation under P of the ￿ltration generated by the Brownian motion
and we let F = FT so that the true state of nature is completely determined by
the paths of the Brownian motion up to the terminal date of the model.
All agents are endowed with the same information structure represented by
F and the same beliefs represented by the probability measure P. All random
processes to appear in the sequel are assumed to be progressively measurable
with respect to the ￿ltration F and all statements involving random quantities
processes are understood to hold either almost surely or almost everywhere
depending on the context.
22.2 Consumption Space and Goods Markets
There is a ￿nite number of perishable consumption goods labelled a 2 A for
some ￿nite set A. The consumption space C is given by the set of non negative,




tjdt < 1; a 2 A
Each of the A := card(A) available consumption goods can be traded in a
perfect spot market. The ￿rst consumption good will be taken as a num￿ eraire
throughout the paper and we will denote by p with p1 = 1 the A￿dimensional
process of relative prices.
2.3 Securities
The ￿nancial market consists of a locally riskless savings account in zero net
supply and n risky stocks in positive net supply each representing a claim to an
exogenously speci￿ed stream of dividends denominated in one of the A available
consumption goods. More precisely, we assume that for each consumption good





of traded securities whose dividends are labelled in consumption good a. The
column vector of dividend rate processes associated to these securities is denoted











for some locally square integrable, vector valued drift ￿a and matrix valued
volatility #a. In what follows, we denote by D the n￿dimensional column
vector obtained by stacking up the good speci￿c dividend vectors ( Da)a2A and
assume that its volatility matrix # has full row rank.
The initial value of the savings account is normalized to one and we assume







for some instantaneous interest rate process r such that the above integral is
well de￿ned. For each consumption good a 2 A, we denote by Sa the vector of

















for some vector valued drift ￿a and matrix valued volatility ￿a such that the
above integrals are well de￿ned. The security prices coe￿cients ( r;f￿a;￿ag),
or equivalently the security price processes ( S0;fSag) as well as the vector p of
relative goods prices are to be determined endogenously in equilibrium.
2.4 Trading Strategies
Trading takes place continuously and there are no market friction. Given the


















where the star superscript denotes transposition. The process ￿0 represents
the number of shares of the savings account held in the portfolio and, for each
consumption good a 2 A, the vector process ￿a represents the number of shares
of each of the stock paying out in good a held in the portfolio.
A trading strategy ￿ is said to be admissible if the associated wealth process,









is uniformly bounded from below by a constant. In what follows, we denote by
￿ the set of all admissible trading strategies.
Remark 1 The requirement that the wealth process of an admissible trading
strategy be bounded from below is standard in the asset pricing literature. It
rules out the possibility of doubling strategies and thus implies that the set ￿
is free of arbitrage opportunities. See Dybvig and Huang (1988).
2.5 Agent’s Preferences and Endowments
The economy is populated by two price taking agents labelled i 2 f1;2g. The
preferences of agent i over consumption plans in C are represented by a time







4We assume that the utility function ui : [0;T] ￿ RA
+ ! R is continuously
di￿erentiable in its ￿rst argument, strictly increasing, strictly concave and three








mapping (0;1)A bijectively onto itself for every ￿xed t 2 [0;T]. In order to
guarantee that certain expectations can be di￿erentiated under the integral







< 1; t 2 [0;T]
where M(b) denotes the set of non negative vectors whose lowest coordinate
is larger than the constant b 2 R+. In the single good case, this condition
is referred to as reasonable asymptotic elasticity and has proved crucial in the
resolution of incomplete markets portfolio and consumption choice problems,
see Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999).
Remark 2 As a result of the above assumptions, we have that for each t 2 [0;T]
the gradient rui(t;￿) admits an inverse which we denote by fi(t;￿). In the single
good case, a well-known necessary and su￿cient condition for this property to
hold is that the utility functions satisfy the Inada conditions.
Agent i is initially endowed with a portfolio consisting of ￿ak
i ￿ 0 shares of
each of the available stocks, where ￿ak
i denotes the kth stock paying dividends in




2 = 1; (a;k) 2 A ￿ f1;:::;nag
so that the net supply of each of the stocks is normalized to one unit. For further




i )￿ the vector of number shares of
stocks paying dividends in good a in the initial portfolio of agent i.
2.6 Feasible Consumption Plans
A consumption plan c 2 C is said to be feasible for agent i if there exists

































5and has a non negative terminal value. In what follows we denote by Ci the set
of consumption plans which are feasible for agent i.
2.7 De￿nition of Equilibrium
In what follows we denote by E := ((￿;F;F;P);fui;￿a
i g;fDag) the primitives
for the above continuous time economy. The concept of equilibrium that we
use throughout this paper is similar to that of equilibrium of plans, prices and
expectations introduced by Radner (1972) and is de￿ned in the following:
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium for the continuous time economy E is a set of
security prices (S0;fSag), a relative price process p and a set of consumption
plans and admissible trading strategies fci;￿ig such that
1. The consumption plan ci maximizes Ui over the feasible set Ci and is
￿nanced by the admissible trading strategy ￿i 2 ￿.












hold for all a 2 A and t 2 [0;T] where 1a denotes an na￿dimensional
column vector of ones.
In our model the dividend processes of the traded securities are linearly
independent since their volatility matrix has full rank. However, because there
are less traded securities than there are Brownian motions, the equilibria for the
economy E have incomplete ￿nancial markets in general. Furthermore, and as
demonstrated by Cass and Pavlova (2004), the equilibrium may very well have
incomplete ￿nancial markets even if there are as many traded securities as there
are Brownian motions. Given this observation, and in order to facilitate our
study, we further restrict ourselves to equilibria that are dynamically e￿cient
in the following sense:
De￿nition 2 An equilibrium for the continuous time economy E is said to be
dynamically e￿cient, or simply e￿cient, if given the securities and goods prices,
the associated consumption allocations are Pareto optimal.
Note that in a static model this notion is also referred to as constrained Pareto
optimality or Pareto optimality in the Diamond sense (see Magill and Quinzii
(1996) for a discussion).
6While the set of equilibria is in general very hard to characterize (see for
example Cuoco and He (1994)), that of e￿cient equilibria is easier to analyze.
Indeed, by the Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations we have that there
exists a strictly positive constant ￿ such that
ru1(t;c1t) = ￿ru2(t;c2t):
Along with the goods market clearing condition, the above restriction implies







where ￿t denotes the vector of good speci￿c aggregate dividends. As a result, all
of the e￿cient equilibria for the continuous time economy E can be supported
by a representative agent endowed with the aggregate supply of securities and
with utility function u(t;￿;￿) even though the resulting ￿nancial markets might
be incomplete. In order to facilitate the presentation of our main results, we
brie￿y review this characterization in the next section.
3 Preliminary Results
3.1 A Useful Notation
In order to facilitate the presentation of our results, we now introduce a vectorial
notation which will be used repeatedly in what follows.
For an arbitrary collection (xa)a2A of vectors with xa 2 Rna, we use the








x1￿ 0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 0






. . . 0 ￿￿￿ 0








The linear operator ￿ allows one to transform a collection of good speci￿c
vectors into a matrix which can then be used in consumption and portfolio
computations. In particular, letting I := ￿(1a) we have that the vector of good
speci￿c aggregate dividend processes is given by ￿t := IDt.
3.2 Individual Optimality
Let the security and goods prices be given and assume that there are no arbitrage
opportunities for otherwise the market could not be in equilibrium. As is well
7known (see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1998)), this assumption implies that there




t ￿t; a 2 A:
Any almost surely square integrable process satisfying the above restrictions is
referred to as a market price of risk or relative risk premium.
Denote by K the set of relative risk premia, and for every such process



















The following proposition shows that the set S := f￿￿ : ￿ 2 Kg coincides with
the set of arbitrage free state price densities and provides a convenient necessary
and su￿cient condition for the optimality of a given consumption plan.
Proposition 1 Assume that the security and goods prices are given, then the
following assertions hold:











for all market price of risk processes ￿ 2 K.







for some strictly positive constant yi and some process ￿i 2 K such that
equation (3) holds as an equality.
Proof. The assertions follow, respectively, from Theorem 8.5 and Theorem 9.3
in Karatzas et al. (1991) after some straightforward modi￿cations. ￿
3.3 A Characterization of E￿cient Equilibria
Assume that there exists an e￿cient equilibrium for the economy E, denote
by fcig the corresponding consumption allocations and let the representative
agent’s utility function be de￿ned as in (2). Since consuming the aggregate
8output must be optimal for the representative agent, it follows from the second








identi￿es the vector of good speci￿c equilibrium state prices. Moreover, Pareto
optimality implies that the consumption allocations solve the representative










where fi(t;￿) denotes the inverse of agent i’s gradient mapping. On the other
hand, the de￿nition of the set of state price densities and the absence of arbitrage









is a local martingale and assuming for the moment that this process is a real















The following proposition justi￿es the assumption that the process Ma is a
uniformly integrable martingale and provides a complete characterization of the
set of e￿cient equilibria.
Proposition 2 Assume that the collection (r;p;fSag;fci;￿ig) is an e￿cient
equilibrium. Then the relative goods prices, the consumption allocations and the
securities prices are respectively given by equations (4), (5) and (6) for some
strictly positive constant ￿.
Proof. All there is to prove is that for each a 2 A the local martingale Ma is in
fact a uniformly integrable martingale. To this end, we start by observing that














where the vector p￿ of good speci￿c state prices is de￿ned as in equation (4).
Summing the above expressions over i and using the goods market clearing
conditions, we deduce that the aggregate wealth in the economy is given by
Rt = W 1













9and it follows that the non negative process de￿ned by





is a uniformly integrable martingale under the objective probability measure.
Now let a 2 A be given and ￿x an arbitrary k 2 f1;￿￿￿ ;nag. As mentioned









is a local martingale and hence a global supermartingale since it is non negative.
On the other hand, the absence of arbitrage opportunities and the de￿nition
of the vector of aggregate dividends imply that Mak ￿ Q. The process Q
being uniformly integrable by construction, it follows from the reverse Fatou
lemma that Mak is a global submartingale. The process Mak being both a
supermartingale and submartingale, it is a martingale. In addition, Mak is
bounded from above by Q , hence uniformly integrable and the desired results
follows. ￿
4 Equilibrium Trading Volume
4.1 The No{Trade Theorem
We now turn to this paper’s main topic and investigate conditions under which
an e￿cient equilibrium generates trade.
Intuition strongly suggests that as soon as the agents populating the economy
are su￿ciently heterogeneous, their demand for the available securities should
￿uctuate over time, thus generating trading activity in both the goods market
and the ￿nancial market. Our main result con￿rms this intuition and comes in
the form of a no{trade theorem.
Theorem 1 The following assertions are equivalent:





10 hold for all a 2 A and there is no activity on
spot market for the consumption goods.


















; i 2 f1;2g
where ￿a
t denotes the aggregate output of good a 2 A at time t 2 [0;T].
103. There exists a diagonal matrix w with strictly positive, constant diagonal



















where I is the rectangular matrix de￿ned in Section 3.1 and ￿ = ID denotes
the vector of good speci￿c aggregate dividends.
Proof. To establish the implication 1 ) 2 , assume that there exists a no{trade
e￿cient equilibrium. First note that the optimal holding of the money market
account must be zero. Indeed, since Sa
T = 0na in the absence of arbitrage
opportunities it follows from individual optimality that











and observing that S0
T is strictly positive we conclude that ￿i0 = ￿0
iT = 0 for
all i 2 f1;2g. On the other hand, applying It^ o’s lemma to (1) and using the







where ￿a := ￿a
10 2 (0;1)na. Since, by de￿nition of a no{trade equilibrium, there
is no activity on the goods markets, the above identity and the goods market
clearing conditions imply that the equilibrium consumption policies are linear
and given by





Now, Pareto optimality of the equilibrium consumption allocations implies that
the marginal utilities of the two agents are aligned in the sense that there exists














Applying It^ o’s lemma to both sides of the above equation and identifying the
















where H denotes the matrix of second derivatives. Since the volatility matrix
















11The above system of equations yields the existence of strictly positive constants
(wa)a2A such that ￿a = wa1a and plugging this back into (10) gives the condi-
tion in Assertion 2 after some straightforward simpli￿cations.
To establish the implication 2 ) 3, assume that there exists an e￿cient
equilibrium satisfying the conditions of Assertion 2 and let w denote the diagonal







; a 2 A:
Using the Pareto optimality of the equilibrium allocations in conjunction with
the assumed form of the consumption plans we obtain that there exists a strictly
positive constant ￿ such that
ru1(t;w￿t) = ￿ru2(t;￿t ￿ w￿t): (11)
Writing the ￿rst coordinate of this vectorial identity at time zero, then allows




and plugging this expression back into equation (11) gives the ￿rst condition in
Assertion 3. On the other hand, the assumed form of the equilibrium allocations
and the second part of Proposition 1 imply that
rui(t;cit) = yipt￿i
t (12)
for some strictly positive constant yi and some arbitrage free state price density
process ￿i := ￿￿i 2 S such that
W i
0 = ￿(￿a








where S denotes the n￿dimensional column vector obtained by stacking up the
good speci￿c securities price vectors ( Sa)a2A. Using (12) in conjunction with










Using the ￿rst coordinate of the above equation at time zero to identify the










12Since it is e￿cient, the equilibrium can be supported by a representative agent
with utility function u(t;￿;￿) as in equation (2) even if the resulting markets
are incomplete. Thus, it follows from the de￿nition of the representative agent’s











Plugging this expression back into equation (14) and rearranging the terms gives
the second condition in Assertion 3.
In order to establish the implication 3 ) 1, and thus complete the proof of
the theorem, we have to show that given a matrix w satisfying the conditions
of Assertion 3 we can construct a no{trade e￿cient equilibrium. To this end,






































Since (i) all markets clear, (ii) there is no trading volume on any of the open
markets and (iii) the marginal utilities of the two agents are aligned, all there
is to prove in order to establish that the collection ( p;fSag;fci;￿ig) constitutes
a no{trade e￿cient equilibrium is that the consumption allocations are optimal








Using the de￿nition of ci in conjunction with the de￿nition of the securities





















13is a martingale we deduce that the process ￿ belongs to the set S of state price
densities and since ci is feasible by construction, it follows from the second part
of Proposition 1 that the consumption plan ci is optimal for agent i. ￿
The results of the above theorem can be summarized as follows. Assertion 2
shows that in a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium, the consumption policies of each of
the agents must exhibit the same growth rate as the corresponding good speci￿c
aggregate output and that, given the existence of an e￿cient equilibrium, this
property is also su￿cient for the existence of a no-trade equilibrium.
The third assertion of the theorem is the most important from a practical
point of view as it provides necessary and su￿cient conditions for the existence
of a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium in terms of the model primitives. In the next
section we review most of the classic forms of multi-goods utility functions and
use Assertion 3 to determine what is the minimal level of non informational
heterogeneity needed to generate non trivial trading volume.
Remark 3 Borch (1962), Wilson (1968) and Huang and Litzenberger (1985)
have shown that a necessary and su￿cient condition for the generic optimality of
linear sharing rules in single good, static economies is that all agents have linear
risk tolerance with identical cautiousness parameters. Our results can be viewed
as a generalization of theirs to the case of multi-goods, dynamic economies.
To see this, consider the single good case with time independent utility
functions. We start by observing that since consumption must be positive at
all times market clearing implies that any linear sharing rule must have a zero
intercept in order to be feasible. Thus, it follows Theorem 1 that given the
existence of an e￿cient equilibrium, the generic optimality of linear sharing rules
is equivalent to the generic existence of a no-trade equilibrium. Using Assertion
3, this is in turn equivalent to the fact that for any aggregate dividend process
there exists a constant w 2 (0;1) such that
￿1(wDt) = ￿2((1 ￿ w)Dt); t 2 [0;T];
where ￿i denotes the relative risk tolerance of agent i. For the above equation
to admit a solution in (0;1) regardless of the aggregate dividend process, it is
necessary and su￿cient that both agents have the same constant relative risk
aversion parameter. We thus conclude that in a single good, continuous time
economy a necessary and su￿cient condition for the generic optimality of linear
sharing rules is that both agents have the same constant relative risk aversion
utility function.
Remark 4 It is well known from Hakansson (1969) and Cass and Stiglitz
(1970), that linear sharing rules in the single good case are related to fund







is equivalent to the existence of a no-trade equilibrium. In the single good case,
this implies that fund separation must hold in a no-trade equilibrium. More
precisely, as W i
t = ci0
￿0 Rt in a no-trade equilibrium, where R corresponds to
the value of the market portfolio de￿ned in (7), any agent holds a constant
fraction of the market portfolio and one-fund separation holds if and only if the
equilibrium is a no-trade equilibrium.
Remark 5 A careful inspection of the proof of Theorem 1 reveals that the only
place where the assumptions of continuous time and It^ o process dynamics are
used is in the proof of the implication 1 ) 2. It follows that, after suitable
modi￿cations of the basic model, the conditions of Assertion 3 are still su￿cient
for the existence of a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium in a discrete time economy
with either ￿nite or in￿nite horizon.
While su￿cient, the conditions of Assertion 3 are far from being necessary in
a discrete time model. Indeed, it can easily be shown that Assertion 3 remains
su￿cient for the existence of a no-trade equilibrium if we replace equation (8)







holds for some collection of non negative vectors ( ￿a)a2A. In a recent paper,
Judd et al. (2003) show that trading volume is generically zero in a discrete
time, single good economy populated by heterogeneous agents. This seems to
contradict our theorem. As they remark, however, their result relies on the
strong distributional assumption of a stationary Markov chain process for the
aggregate dividend. In that particular case, equilibrium consumption allocations
inherit the time homogeneity properties of the dividend process and it follows
that there always exists a solution to equation (16) irrespective of the choice of
the utility functions. To illustrate this, let us consider, as in Judd et al. (2003),
a single good economy with N states of the world and J = N stocks paying
linearly independent dividends. Equation (16) may be rewritten as
u0
1(t;￿￿Dn) = ￿u0
2(t;(1 ￿ ￿)￿Dn) n 2 f1;Ng (17)
where Dn is the vector of dividends in state n and ￿ is a strictly positive constant.
When utility functions are time separable and discount rates are identical across











The marginal utilities u0
1(￿) and u0
2(￿) being strictly decreasing functions, there
always is a solution to this system of equation. As a result, when the dividend
process follows a stationary Markov chain, a no trade equilibrium can always
be constructed irrespective of the choice of the utility functions.
Remark 6 Assertion 2 is su￿cient for the existence of a no-trade equilibrium
even if the equilibrium is not e￿cient. This follows since any market clearing
allocation which satis￿es Assertion 2, can be ￿nanced by a no-trade portfolio
policy independently of whether the equilibrium is e￿cient or not.
4.2 Examples
We illustrate here the implications of Theorem 1 for some common classes of
utility functions. For simplicity we assume throughout this section that there
are only two consumptions goods (A = 2) and that there is only one security
paying out in each of the two available consumption goods ( n1 = n2 = 1).
Constant Elasticity of Substitution
As a ￿rst example, we consider the class of CES utility functions. Agents’










where k is a non negative constant subjective discount rate which we assume
equal across agents, ￿i 2 (0;1) and ￿ia > 0 are ￿xed constants. Using the
equivalent assertions of Theorem 1 we now show that, given such preferences,
a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium exists if and only if the agents have the same
elasticity of substitution.
Corollary 1 Assume that agents have constant elasticity of substitution utility
functions. Then a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium exists if and only if ￿1 = ￿2.
Proof. According to the third assertion of Theorem 1, we have that there exists


















16and the static budget constraint (9) holds. If the coe￿cients ￿i di￿er across
agents, then the above equation implies that the dividends are proportional
almost everywhere. This contradicts the assumption that the volatility matrix
of the dividend process has full rank, and thus implies that the above equation
can only hold if ￿1 = ￿2. Assuming that this is indeed the case and solving the
above equation for the constant w1 we obtain












Plugging this relation back into the static budget constraint of agent 1, we
obtain that a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium exists provided that there exists a













where G denotes the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements g(￿). Using well-
known analytic arguments, as found for example in Detemple and Serrat (2003),
it is easily shown that under our assumptions the function h is continuous on
the interval (0;1) with
h(0+) := lim
￿!0
h(￿) < 0 < h(1￿) := lim
￿!1
h(￿):
This implies the existence of a point ￿ such that h(￿) = 0 and it follows that
there exists a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium. ￿
Note that in this example the existence of a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium
does not require that the agents have the same utility function. In particular, a
no-trade e￿cient equilibrium can exist even though the agents attribute di￿erent
weights to consumption in each of the goods ( ￿1a 6= ￿2a).
Non Separable Cobb{Douglas Preferences
Agents have non separable Cobb{Douglas preferences, if their utility function
take the parametric form
ui(t;c) := e￿kt ￿
c1￿￿i1 ￿
c2￿￿i2
where k is a non negative constant subjective discount rate which we assume
equal across agents and ￿ia 2 [0;1] are constants such that ￿i1 + ￿i2 < 1. Note
that this parametric form is the limit of the constant elasticity of substitution
speci￿cation as the coe￿cient ￿i goes to zero.
17Corollary 2 Assume that agents have non separable Cobb{Douglas preferences.
Then a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium exists if and only if ￿1a = ￿2a for all a 2 A.
Proof. According to the third assertion of Theorem 1, we have that a no-trade


























and the static budget constraint (9) holds. The dividend processes associated
with the risky securities being linearly independent by assumption, the ￿rst of
the above equations cannot hold unless we have ￿1a = ￿2a and solving the
second equation for the constant w1 we ￿nd










Plugging this relation back into the static budget constraint of agent 1 and
invoking an argument similar to that used in the proof of Corollary 1 then gives
the existence of a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium. ￿
Separable Cobb{Douglas Preferences










where k is a non negative constant subjective discount rate which we assume
equal across agents and ￿ia 2 (￿1;1)nf0g are constants. Using the equivalent
assertions of Theorem 1, we now show that a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium exists
if and only if the agents preferences exhibit the same relative risk aversion.
Corollary 3 Assume that agents have separable Cobb{Douglas preferences. In
this case, a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium exists if and only if ￿1a = ￿2a for all
a 2 A.
Proof. According to the third assertion of Theorem 1, we have that there exists
























and the static budget constraint (9) holds. The ￿rst of these equations implies
that ￿11 = ￿21. On the other hand, the dividend processes associated with the
risky securities being stochastic, the second of the above equation cannot hold
unless we have ￿12 = ￿22. Assuming that this is the case and solving the second
equation for the non negative constant w1 we ￿nd















Plugging this relation back into the static budget constraint of agent 1 and
invoking an argument similar to that used in the proof of Corollary 1 then gives
the existence of a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium. ￿
Remark 7 In the absence of non traded goods, this speci￿cation of the agents
utility function is a special case, with identical discount rates, of that employed
in Serrat (2001). In his Section 3.2 the author claims that in the absence of non
tradable goods agents follow buy and hold strategies. Using the above results,
we note that this claim is only valid provided that the subjective discount rate
is the same for the two agents.
Log{Linear Preferences




￿i1 log(c1) + ￿i2 log(c2)
o
where k is a non-negative constant subjective discount rate which we assume
equal across agents and ￿ia are strictly positive, agent speci￿c constants. This
speci￿cation of preferences has been used in numerous studies including those
of Zapatero (1995) and Cass and Pavlova (2004).
Corollary 4 Assume that agents have log{linear preferences. Then a no{trade
e￿cient equilibrium exists for all (￿ia) 2 (0;1)4.
Proof. Using the equivalent assertions of Theorem 1 in conjunction with the log{
linear structure of the agents’ preferences, we deduce that a no-trade e￿cient























admits a solution in (0;1)2. Using the ￿rst equation to express w1 as a function
of w2 and plugging the result in the second equation we obtain that the above










￿22￿21 + ￿12￿11(1 ￿ w2)
:
Using the fact that the non negative constants ￿a
1 are smaller than one by
assumption, it is then easily seen that the above solution belongs to (0 ;1)2 and
it follows that a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium exists. ￿
Having established the existence of a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium, we can
now recover its main characteristics from Proposition 2. In particular, equation













and plugging this back into the pricing relations (6) shows that the equilibrium












With this particular form of utility function the price of the ￿rst stock is a
linear function of the ￿rst dividend, and since the relative price of the second
good is proportional to the ratio of dividends, the price of the second stock is
also a linear function of the ￿rst dividend. It follows that the stock volatility
matrix is degenerate and hence that markets are incomplete even though the
dividends were assumed to be linearly independent. In Cass and Pavlova (2004)
this situation is labelled as a Peculiar Financial Equilibrium. We stress here the
fact that this type of equilibrium is not equivalent to the no trade equilibria we
identi￿ed in Theorem 1. The two latter classes intersect in the log linear case,
but peculiar ￿nancial equilibria are associated to the log-linear speci￿cation,
whereas no-trade e￿cient equilibria may occur for any utility function satisfying
the conditions of Theorem 1.
205 Discussion and Extensions
As demonstrated by the above examples, a no-trade e￿cient equilibrium can
exist even if the agents do not have the exact same preferences. Given this
result, one naturally wonders what other sources of heterogeneity could gener-
ate non trivial equilibrium trading volume. In order to partially answer this
question, we now brie￿y discuss two extensions of the basic model: one incor-
porating heterogeneous beliefs and one where the agents receive random ￿ows
of endowments through time.
5.1 Heterogeneous Beliefs
Throughout the paper we have maintained the assumption that agents di￿er
only through their utility functions and initial portfolios. In particular, we have
assumed up to now that the two agents share the same beliefs about the current
state of the economy and its future evolution.
Standard economic intuition strongly suggests that heterogeneity in beliefs is
likely to increase exchanges among agents. In order to con￿rm this intuition, we
consider an economy with a single consumption good and a single risky security
(A = n = 1). Agent i’s beliefs are summarized by the density process Zi of
his equivalent subjective probability measure P i with respect to the objective
probability measure P. As a result, the preferences of agent i are represented













where Ei is the expectation operator under the agent’s probability measure P i.
The economy is otherwise identical to our previous description.
Now assume that there exists a no{trade e￿cient equilibrium. In any such
equilibrium, the Pareto optimality of the consumption allocations and the fact






holds almost everywhere for some strictly positive constants ￿ and w < 1. For
this relation to hold, divergence in beliefs must exactly compensate the potential
divergence in marginal utilities. While it might be possible to construct such
beliefs structures, their economic relevance seems doubtful.
5.2 Random Endowments
In this section we present an extension of the results of Theorem 1 to the case
where the agents di￿er not only in their preferences and initial portfolios but
21also in their intertemporal endowments. To accommodate such an extension
of the basic model we assume throughout this section that there are multiple
goods but a single traded security paying its dividends in each of the available
goods (na = 1;a 2 A).
In addition to an initial portfolio of shares of the available securities, agents
now receive a random ￿ow of endowment in each of the available good. We
denote by ea
i the rate at which agent i receives his endowment in good a and
assume that the corresponding vector of good speci￿c endowments is a bounded








for some exogenously given drift process &i and volatility matrix ￿i. In such a
setting, a consumption plan is said to be feasible for agent i if there exists an



































and has a non negative terminal value. In the following corollary we provide
necessary and su￿cient conditions for the existence of a no trade equilibrium
for the above continuous time economy with random endowments. We state the




the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 5 The following assertions are equivalent





10 hold for all a 2 A and there is no activity on
the spot market for the consumption goods.













; i 2 f1;2g:
where Da is the dividend process associated with the only security paying
out in good a 2 A.
223. There exists a diagonal matrix ￿ with strictly positive, constant diagonal




ru2(t;Dt ￿ ￿Dt + e2t)














where D denotes the vector of good speci￿c dividend processes and ￿ is the
linear operator de￿ned in Section 3.1.
Note that, as in the case of heterogeneous beliefs considered in the previous
section, it is always possible to construct the agents’ endowment processes in
such a way that, given the other primitives of the economy, there exists a no-
trade e￿cient equilibrium. An example of such a construction, albeit in a slightly
di￿erent setup, can be found in Constantinides and Du￿e (1996).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated under what conditions non informational het-
erogeneity among agents leads to non trivial equilibrium trading volume. Our
main result comes in the form of a non informational no-trade theorem which
provides necessary and su￿cient conditions for the existence of of a no-trade
equilibrium in a continuous time economy with multiple goods and heteroge-
nous agents. Our results are illustrated on a number of classical examples and
relations with the literature on linear sharing rules are addressed.
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